First Conviction Under New York Barratry Statute by unknown
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 11 
Number 3 Volume 11, Summer 1965, Number 3 Article 12 
October 2016 
First Conviction Under New York Barratry Statute 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(1965) "First Conviction Under New York Barratry Statute," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 11 : No. 3 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol11/iss3/12 
This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
"dynamite" was not to be "exploded before
there was any reason to think that blasting
was necessary. '2 5 At Walker's trial when
the court inquired whether the jury, after
four and one-half hours of deliberation, de-
sired any further assistance in regard to
the law, the foreman replied: "Your Hon-
or, we think we will reach a verdict soon.
We don't think we are very far from it."'26
There was obviously no deadlock. Yet, the
"Allen charge" was given.
A use of the charge, such as that
approved by the instant Court, is osten-
sibly contrary to established precedent. It
is true that precedent is often overturned,
just as it is true that dissenting opinions be-
come law. But it is rare that good law
evolves from a disregard of a sound judi-
cial premise. In Walker it seems that the
Court disregarded the relevant proposition
25 Green v. United States, supra note 24, at 856.
26 Walker v. United States, supra note 22, at 25.
First Conviction Under
New York Barratry Statute
Appellant was convicted of common
barratry on proof that he had personally,
with malicious intent, instituted nine
groundless claims, actions or legal pro-
ceedings against the complainant in small
claims and municipal courts. The Court of
Appeals, in affirming the first conviction
for barratry in the history of New York
State,1 held that Section 323 of the New
1 It is interesting to note that the appellant was
previously convicted of barratry in 1961. How-
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that "a verdict brought about by judicial
coercion is a nullity in the eyes of the
law."' 21 With proper and due deference to
the implication of the Court's instruction,
the minority juror could only comply by
yielding his conviction. Is this not an appli-
cation of pressure by the Court?
In his separate opinion, Judge Brown
quoted Judge Wisdom's opinion in Green
v. United States:28 "the Allen or 'dynamite'
charge is designed to blast loose a dead-
locked jury. . . . There is no justification
whatever for its coercive use." 29
The charge, as used in Walker, is appar-
ently improper. When functioning within
its limits, the "Allen charge" harmonizes
divergent views without unduly influencing
the minority juror. But when it exceeds
these limits, it is as offensive as the ancient
common-law practices.
27 Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 157
A.2d 65 (1959).
28 Cases cited note 24 supra.
29 Green v. United States, supra note 24, at 854.
York Penal Law had modified the com-
mon-law rule so as to render one guilty of
common barratry who has himself, cor-
ruptly or maliciously instituted at least
three groundless actions or legal proceed-
ings.2 People v. Budner, 15 N.Y.2d 253,
206 N.E.2d 171, 258 N.Y.S.2d 73
(1965).
ever, the appellate division reversed upon a find-
ing, inter alia, that the prosecution had failed to
prove malice. People v. Budner, 13 App. Div.
2d 253, 215 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1st Dep't 1961).
2 Section 323 reads: "Upon a conviction for
common barratry, the fact that the defendant was
himself a party in interest or upon the record to
any action or legal proceeding complained of is
not a defense."
RECENT DECISIONS
At early common law, barratry was the
practice of encouraging or maintaining
suits or quarrels in the courts by (1) dis-
turbing the peace, (2) taking or detaining
the possession of property in question by
subtlety and deceit, or (3) fostering cal-
umny resulting in discord between neigh-
bors.3 Later, the definition was expanded
to include any incitement of litigation be-
tween subjects of the King.4
In order to sustain a conviction for bar-
ratry at common law, it was necessary to
show that the offender had incited litiga-
tion in several instances5 and had not
brought any of the suits in his own rightS'
It was not a defense to claim that malicious
intent or an intent to vex and annoy was
lacking.7 In addition, it was immaterial
that the suits were in fact meritorious. 8
At common law, there was a strong
aversion to the institution of litigation.9
Barratry, -and its sister offenses, chain-
perty10 and maintenance, 1 were based on
3The Case of Barratry, 77 Eng. Rep. 528, 8
Co. Rep. 36b (1588). There are several deriva-
tions of the term "barratry." Some say that it is
derived from the French word barrateur signify-
ing "deceiver," while others contend it is derived
from the Latin word baratro which signifies a
"vile knave." Another theory regarding the ori-
gin of the word is based upon its usage and stems
from two legal terms: barra meaning "the court-
room bar" at which cases were argued and ret-
turn meaning "offense." Literally then, a barrator
is a "bar offender." Id. at 529, 8 Co. Rep. at
37b.
4 EHRLICH, EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE 802 (1st ed.
1959).
5 Voorhees v. Dorr, 51 Barb. 580, 587 (N.Y.
1868); 9 C.J.S. Barratry § 2(b) (1938).
6 1 RUSSELL, CRIMES 371 (10th ed. 1950).
7See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 454 (1957). But
see State v. Batson, 220 N.C. 411, 17 S.E.2d 511
(1941).
8 State v. Chitty, 17 S.C. (1 Bail.) 379 (1830).
9 1 RUSSELL, op. cit. supra note 6.
10 Champerty was an agreement whereby the
champertor agreed to pay the expenses of a suit
a "mind your own business" philosophy
which was, at one time, carried to the ex-
treme of making it criminal for one to tes-
tify at a trial without having been pre-
viously subpoenaed.'
2
In New York, barratry is defined as "the
practice of exciting groundless judicial pro-
ceedings."' 3 Although the barratry statutes
have been in effect since 1881, and al-
though barratry was a crime at common
law in New York, until 1965 there had
never been 'a sustained conviction for the
crime 14
In the instant case, the appellant or-
dered a suit of clothes to be made by the
complainant. Subsequently, the appellant
returned the suit, claiming that it did not
fit properly. Thereafter, he instituted nine
claims or other actions against the com-
plainant. All of these actions, with the ex-
ception of two in which the appellant
obtained default judgments, were either
dismissed or resulted in a decision for com-
plainant. 15
Judge Van Voorhis, speaking for the
majority, stated that although a conviction
could not have been had at common law
against a party to the litigation, Section
323 of the Penal Law was clearly intended
by the legislature to modify that princi-
in return for a share of the land or other matter
sued for, should the suit be successful. PERKINS,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 449.
"1 Maintenance was an officious intermeddling in
a suit that in no way concerned the intermeddler.
It was an offense against public justice because
it fostered strife and contention and perverted
the remedial processes of the law. PERKINS, Op.
cit. supra note 7, at 448.
12 PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 449; see 1
RUSSELL, op. cit. supra note 6.
13 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 320.
14 See People v. Budner, supra note I.
'5 People v. Budner, 15 N.Y.2d 253, 255, 206
N.E.2d 171, 258 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (1965).
ple. 16 The statute was thus interpreted as
rendering amenable to criminal prosecu-
tion one who is himself a party to barra-
trous litigation.
Chief Judge Desmond dissented on the
ground that the legislature never contem-
plated a change in the common-law rule
which precluded a prosecution for barratry
when the "common barrator" had brought
the actions in his own right. He reasoned
that the only change from the common-law
rule is that a person cannot now elude
liability under the statute by joining him-
self as a party to an action brought by an-
other. 1 7
Despite Judge Desmond's interpretation,
there is a wide disparity between the statu-
tory and the common-law requirements for
a conviction of barratry. The statutes sub-
stitute specific criminal intent for the gen-
eral criminal intent formerly required, and
dictate that the litigation be groundless, a
requirement non-existent at common law."'
The wording of section 323 that "the fact
that the defendant was himself a party in
interest or upon the record, is not a de-
fense" also indicates a deviation from the
common-law rule.
The decision as it stands does not por-
tend any major changes in the course of
litigation in New York or in the choice of
remedies available to one harassed by vex-
atious suits. The tort action of malicious
prosecution would seem to be the more
appropriate remedy, if the plaintiff can
show that his person or property was in-
16 Id. at 256, 206 N.E.2d at 172, 258 N.Y.S.2d
at 75.
17 Id. at 257, 206 N.E.2d at 173, 258 N.Y.S.2d
at 76.
18 PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 454.
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terfered with by legal process. 19 The
stringent requirements needed for con-
viction in a criminal case may motivate a
person harassed by vexatious actions to
seek the civil rather than the criminal
remedy. For example, a criminal convic-
tion of barratry requires a showing that
the offender had instigated at least three
groundless proceedings with malicious in-
tent.20 This must be proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.21 In addition, the com-
plainant is unable to recover damages and
can merely have the satisfaction of seeing
the offender imprisoned or fined.
22
On the other hand, if an action is
brought civilly for malicious prosecution,
the plaintiff may recover damages. 23 It is
not necessary to prove that three suits were
instituted, or to prove the offender's malici-
ous intent beyond a reasonable doubt.24 It
is important to bear in mind, however,
that although the tort remedy may be pre-
ferable to a criminal action, institution of
one does not necessarily preclude the
other.
The decision in Budner, although it will
not engender a major change in the law, is
a step in the direction of preventing seri-
ous abuses of our judicial system. Since
the remedy of malicious prosecution may
not always be available to defendants in
civil actions it is clear that, while barratry
will not be a primary recourse for harassed
defendants, it will be an important deter-
rent to the use of the courts solely for the
purpose of vexing certain individuals.
'9 4 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK
PRACTICE § 162 (1953).
20 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 322.
21 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940).
22 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 321.
23 See PROSSER, TORTS 868 (3d ed. 1964).
24 9 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 21, § 2498.
RECENT DECISIONS
No Negative Inference from
Defendant's Refusal to Testify
Petitioner was convicted of murder in a
state court after a trial during which the
prosecutor had commented extensively on
his refusal to take the stand. The court had
instructed the jury that, while the defend-
ant had a constitutional right not to testify,
they might reasonably infer the truth of
alleged facts which were within petitioner's
knowledge but which he refused to deny
or explain. The Supreme Court of the
United States reversed the conviction and
held that the prohibition against compul-
sory self-incrimination contained in the
fifth amendment, and made applicable to
the states by the fourteenth amendment,
forbids both comment by the prosecutor on
the accused's silence and instructions by
the court that such silence is evidence of
guilt. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965).
At common law, during the period of
the Star Chamber and Court of High
Commission, there existed an inquisitional
system of criminal justice.' Defendants
were summoned into court, often merely as
suspects, and were compelled to answer
numerous questions covering a wide range
of topics.2 In response to this type of "jus-
tice" there evolved a common-law privi-
lege against compelling self-incriminating
testimony.3 This privilege later became a
rule of law which prohibited the defendant
in a criminal case from being a witness,
even if he so desired. 4
18 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 I(1)(b)(i)-(2)
(b) (McNaughton's rev. ed. 1961).
2 Id. at 1(3); see also Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 620 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
3 8 WIGMORE, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 1(3); see
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908).
4 See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 65
(1893).
In the United States, as a reaction to
inquisitional criminal "justice" and other
abuses which existed during colonial
times,5 a provision against self-incrimina-
tion was included in the fifth amendment.6
Congress, however, found the common-law
rule, preventing a defendant from being a
witness, inequitable when applied to a de-
fendant who was able, by his testimony, to
prove his innocence. Accordingly, a fed-
eral statute was passed which permitted the
defendant in federal courts to testify if he
so wished.7 It was made explicit, however,
that his failure to testify created no pre-
sumption of guilt against him.
Under this statute the Supreme Court,
as early as 1893, decided that it was re-
versible error in a federal court for the
prosecutor or judge to comment on the
failure of the defendant to testify. The
rule against "comment" was further en-
larged by the Supreme Court in the case of
Bruno v. United States,9 which held that,
by virtue of the statute, the defendant in a
federal court had the right to have the jury
5 Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional His-
tory of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 783-89 (1935).
'The fifth amendment reads in part: "No per-
son .. .shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself .. " The consti-
tution of every state except Iowa and New Jer-
sey contains a prohibition against self-incrimina-
tion. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 2252,
n.1.
7 "[[In the trial of all indictments, informations,
complaints, and other proceedings against per-
sons charged with the commission of crimes,
offences, and misdemeanors, in the United States
Courts ...the person so charged shall, at his
own request, but not otherwise, be a competent
witness. And his failure to make such request
shall not create any presumption against hi."
20 Stat. 30 (1878); 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1948).
(Emphasis added.)
' Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
9 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
instructed that his failure to testify created
no presumption against him. It is im-
portant to note that these cases, and in
fact all of the federal cases dealing with
"comment," are based on federal statutes
and not directly on the right against self-
incrimination contained in the fifth amend-
ment. 0
It was decided early that the bill of
rights had no direct applicability to the
states, but merely acted as a restraint upon
the federal government.11 In 1908, how-
ever, in Twining v. New Jersey,12 it was
argued before the Supreme Court that the
states were forbidden from commenting on
the failure of a defendant to take the stand.
The bases for this contention were: first,
the fifth amendment's protection against
self-incrimination prohibits "comment";
and, secondly, the fifth amendment's pro-
tection against self-incrimination is bind-
ing upon the states by virtue of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
13
The Court assumed that the fifth amend-
ment did protect against "comment" but
found that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment did not protect a
defendant in a state criminal proceeding
from self-incrimination. 14
In 1947, the same issue was before the
Court in the case of Adamson v. Cali-
fornia.1 5 Although the Court held that the
10 See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1,
2 (1960); Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301,
304-05 (1895).
"I Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243
(1833).
12 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
13The fourteenth amendment reads in part:
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law .. "
14 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114
(1908).
15 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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fourteenth amendment guaranteed a de-
fendant in a state court a fair trial, it found
that the privilege against self-incrimination
was not so essential to a fair trial as to
be included within the scope of the due
process clause.16
In 1964, the Supreme Court, in Malloy
v. Hogan,'1 7 held for the first time that a
defendant in a state criminal proceeding
was protected against self-incrimination by
the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court based its decision
on the fact that the foundation of the
American system of criminal justice is ac-
cusatorial rather than inquisitional, and
that its essential mainstay is the provision
of the fifth amendment that no person shall
be compelled to be a witness against him-
self."'
In the instant case the Supreme Court
held that the federal rule prohibiting com-
ment on the failure of the defendant to tes-
tify is part of the fifth amendment's pro-
tection against self-incrimination.
The Court believed that "comment" is a
remnant of the "inquisitorial system of
criminal justice" 19 and, therefore, is forbid-
den by the fifth amendment .2  The Court
also found that when a judge or a prosecu-
tor comments on a defendant's silence, that
silence is, in effect, being offered to the
jury as evidence against him. Therefore,
the defendant is being penalized for exer-
cising a constitutional right. 21 The Court
next reaffirmed its earlier holding that once
a right contained in the bill of rights is
16 Id. at 53.
17 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
18 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
19 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
55 (1964).
20 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614
(1965).
21 Ibid.
RECENT DECISIONS
deemed applicable to the states, the mini-
mal standard for determining a violation of
this right is to be the same whether the
right is violated in a state court or in a
federal court. 22 Hence, the minimum rights
which a defendant possesses in a state
criminal court with reference to self-
incrimination must be the same as those
which accrue to him in a federal court.
The dissenters expressed the view that
"comment" was not a violation of due
process of law as such. 23 They did not be-
lieve that the "no comment" rule was part
of the fifth amendment, but rather, con-
tended that comment on the failure of the
defendant to testify was a procedural
matter, which, while regulated in the fed-
eral courts by statute, should be left to
local regulation in the state courts.24
As a direct result of Griffin, the criminal
procedure of six states has been altered.
(These states allowed comment by the
prosecutor and/or judge on the failure of
the defendant to take the stand.25) The
22 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
(prohibition against self-incrimination contained
in the fifth amendment made applicable to the
states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (right to counsel contained in the sixth
amendment made applicable to the states); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure con-
tained in the fourth amendment made applicable
to the states).
23Griffin v. California, supra note 20, at 619
(dissenting opinion).
24 id. at 623.
25 "Of the six States which permit comment, two,
California and Ohio, give this permission by
means of an explicit constitutional qualification
of the privilege against self-incrimination. Cal.
Const. Art. I, § 13; Ohio Const. Art. I, § 10.
New Jersey permits comment, State v. Corby, 28
N.J. 106, 145 A.2d 289 . . . but its constitution
contains no provision embodying the privilege
against self-incrimination. . . . The absence of
an express constitutional privilege against self-
Court did not indicate whether the deci-
sion in the instant case will be applied re-
troactively in these six states. Presumably
it will, since this has been the previous
policy of the Supreme Court with regard
to procedure which has been found to vio-
late due process.
The instant case is a good illustration
of the recent trend making federal criminal
procedure based on the bill of rights ap-
plicable to the states by "absorption" into
the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.26 This trend has resulted in
the creation of a degree of uniformity in
the procedural safeguards afforded defend-
ants in state as well as federal criminal
proceedings.
It is important to note, however, that
despite this trend there will probably never
be complete uniformity of standards since
Congress and the Supreme Court possess a
supervisory power over procedure in the
federal courts which they do not possess
over state courts. 27 It is only constitutional
standards which can be made applicable to
the states through due process, and not
federal criminal procedure based on statute
or rules of the Supreme Court.
This distinction gives rise to a most im-
portant question which Griffin leaves un-
incrimination also puts Iowa among the six. See
State v. Ferguson, 226 Iowa 361, 372-373, 283
N.W. 917, 923. Connecticut permits comment by
the judge but not by the prosecutor. State v.
Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 174 A. 181, 94 A.L.R. 696.
New Mexico permits comment by the prosecutor
but holds that the accused is then entitled to an
instruction that 'the jury shall indulge no pre-
sumption against the accused because of his fail-
ure to testify'. N.M.Stat.Ann. § 41-12-19; State
v. Sandoval, 59 N.M. 85, 279 P.2d 850." Griffin
v. California, supra note 20, at 611-12 n.3.
26 See note 22 supra.
27 See DOWLING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 668 n.5
(6th ed. 1959).
answered, viz., is the defendant in a state
court entitled to the instruction that his
failure to testify creates no presumption
against him? The defendant in a federal
court is entitled to this instruction, but the
basis for this right has always been merely
statutory.2 8
It appears that when the question does
arise the Supreme Court will hold that such
instruction is required, since an inference
of guilt drawn by a jury would penalize a
defendant for exercising his constitutional
right."9
As previously noted, the recent trend
of the Supreme Court has been to "ab-
sorb" specific procedural safeguards of the
bill of rights into the due process clause
thereby making them applicable to the
states.30 From a moral and logical point
28See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287
(1939).
29See Griffin v. California, supra note 20, at
614-15.
0 See note 22 supra.
State not Required
to Provide Counsel
on Appeal to Supreme Court
Appellant, an indigent, was convicted of
escaping from an honor farm of the state
penitentiary. He filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the district court, asserting that
the rights afforded him by the equal pro-
tection and due process clauses of the four-
teenth amendment had been violated by
the refusal of the Supreme Court of New
Mexico to appoint counsel to assist him in
appealing to the United States Supreme
Court. The district court denied relief. The
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of view, there seems to be little doubt that
a defendant in a state criminal prosecution
should be protected by the fundamental
procedural safeguards found in the bill of
rights. However, one vital question still
remains: is the Supreme Court constitu-
tionally justified in finding that these pro-
cedural safeguards are contained in the
due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
If, as a minority of the Justices have
stated, the Court has expanded the concept
of due process beyond all rational basis,",
then the Supreme Court has, in effect,
usurped the authority of Congress and has
effected by judicial decision what can prop-
erly be done only by constitutional amend-
ment.
31 See, e.g., Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opin-
ion in Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 22, at 14;
see also Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorpo-
ration" of the Bill of Rights Into the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78
HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965).
Court of Appeals affirmed and held that a
state court is not required to appoint coun-
sel for an indigent in taking such an ap-
peal. Peters v. Cox, 341 F.2d 575 (10th
Cir. 1965).
The right to counsel has been recognized
in federal criminal proceedings since the
adoption of the federal constitution.' Al-
though the unqualified right existed, the
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part that "In
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an im-
partial jury . . . and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."
